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Openness is essential for democratic leadership, representing a moral commitment and an 
instrument to increase trust and legitimacy. However, secrecy can still aid a leader, providing 
a means of protecting power, guarding substantive policies or preserving reputation.  
 
This paper examines how Theresa May used secrecy around the UK-EU Brexit negotiations 
to protect her power, policy and reputation. While this appeared initially successful, over time 
the counter-pressure of openness have reversed any benefits. By the beginning of 2019 it was 
clear that May’s secrecy had limited her power, undermined her policy and ultimately 
damaged her reputation. The analysis ends by comparing drawing comparisons with Donald 
Trump, who has similarly sought to hide his actions, with counter-productive results.  
 
The case study illustrates how secrecy can create political space and bolster reputations in the 
short term. However, in increasingly transparent governance systems such as the US and UK, 
secrets are much harder to keep long-term. Secret-keeping encourages leaking and greater 
scrutiny, exposes policies and damages reputations. Context is key, and secrecy is more 
difficult for high profile controversial issues, such as Brexit, and particularly damaging if 





In contemporary democracies, openness and honesty are regarded as essential pillars of 
ethical leadership. In part it is a moral expectation, as transparency is a core democratic value. 
Secrecy is typically associated with “stealth and furtiveness, lying and denial” (Bok, 1986, p. 
8). 
Instrumentally, transparency is a means for a leader to maintain trust, legitimacy and support, 
as citizens “invest...in their leaders’ integrity and capacity for truth-telling” (Kane & Patapan, 
2012, p. 50; Curtin & Meijer, 2006; de Fine Licht, 2014). Openness is also preventative, 
deterring leaders from acting unethically or abuse their power (Helms, 2014).  
In an age of transparency, openness is a virtue and a safety net for a leader, while secrecy is 
increasingly both a “cardinal sin” and a route, if exposed, to “political crisis” (Kane & 
Patapan, 2012, p. 50).  
 
Greater openness, however, can make good democratic political leadership more difficult. 
The exposure of government affairs can demystify government, exposing the messiness of 
democratic processes and promoting cynicism or disillusionment (Halachmi & Greiling, 
2013). It can make for posturing, “gotcha”-type exposes or de-contextualized and over-
simplified discussions of complex issues (Heclo, 1999). Openness can also be used as means 
of controlling information or obfuscating, while reinforcing certain narratives about state and 
society (Moran, 2012; Luscombe & Walby, 2017; Birchall, 2011).  
 
Contemporary leaders are caught between growing demands, and stronger legal requirements, 
for transparency, and the pressure to achieve tangible outcomes in complex hostile political 
environments. The pressure is heighted by a changing political ecosystem that is more chaotic 
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and uncertain (Helms, 2014). In such an environment, leaders must cultivate a kind of 
“virtuous hypocrisy”, where their commitment to openness is tempered by a “necessary 
caution” and secrecy in different contexts (Kane & Patapan, 2012, p. 59).  
 
 
Leadership and Secrecy 
 
Despite growing pressure towards openness, leaders still have powerful incentives for 
concealment and probably prefer secrecy over openness (Berliner, 2014). They often vacillate 
between pushing openness reforms as a means to bestow political capital upon themselves 
and falling back on secrecy instruments when it suits them (Birchall, 2018; Worthy, 2017). A 
leader’s commitment to transparency normally decreases while in office, with concealment 
becoming a more attractive option as opposition builds and political honeymoons come to an 
end (Worthy, 2017).  
 
As a strategy, secrecy can be used to conceal personal or political failure and even crimes 
(Schlesinger, 1987; Aftergood, 2009). Numerous US presidents have “misled” by “omission 
or commission” and through secrecy, concealment or deception for good and ill (Dallek, 
2010, p. 10). Leaders have misled and obfuscated over seemingly minor issues, as did Clinton 
over his golf prowess, or even over major policies shifts and policy, as Lincoln did over 
emancipation (Pfiffner, 2004). 
 
This article sets out three ways motivations for secrecy: concealment can serve a power, 
reputation or a substantive function. However, each incentive carries pitfalls and risks, which 





Secrecy enhances a leaders’ room for maneuver in the face of strong opposition, or political 
polarization. Secrecy can allow a leader to plan, predict and even forecast away from the glare 
of enemies, or allow them the flexibility to compromise or change away from the public gaze 
(Schlesinger, 1987). In this sense, secrecy becomes a form of political maneuvering, driven 
by prudence, precaution and the need to control the narrative (Horn, 2011.). Secrecy can help 
a leader “implement their interests with fewer restraints” (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2017, p. 2-3). 
 
It can also have the opposite effect and can provoke leaks from within or greater demands for 
transparency from without (Aldrich & Moran, 2018). Since secrecy is a “spectacle for public 
consumption”, such speculation alone can affect governments’ legitimacy (Bratich, 2013; 
Fenster, 2014). The act of keeping secrets itself can be counter-productive. The so-called 
“Streisand effect” means, as Jansen and Martin (2015) put it, that “attempts to suppress 
information had the unintended consequence of stimulating greater demand” (p. 657). Further, 
secrecy consumes time and political energy as “censorship...commonly requires active 
maintenance” (Jansen & Martin, 2015, p. 667). Finally, cover-up strategies can backfire, 




Secrecy strategies are can be used for substantive purposes, to protect and support certain 
policies and decisions. Confidentiality is recognized as legitimate in shielding certain 
deliberations and negotiations (Chambers, 2004; Bok, 1986). Secrecy can be vital in 
protecting early or delicate discussions, especially around intractable problems or contentious 
5 
 
issues (Curtin, 2014). Too much openness might lead to rigid posturing that can undermine 
deal-making (Stasavage, 2005; Chambers, 2004; Cain, 2016). The need for such protection is 
given legal backing by specific instruments such as executive privilege, official secrecy 
legislation and constitutional conventions, such as collective responsibility. Many FOI laws, 
for example, specifically exclude the formulation of policy or international discussions. 
 
However, a balance needs to be struck, especially where a policy carries clear importance. 
Closed-door meetings raise suspicion of undemocratic deals, and there is a growing 
democratic case for making important negotiations as open as possible (Prat, 2006; 




Finally, secrecy and transparency strategies carry a reputational dimension. Secrecy can be 
favored by leaders who seek to minimize blame or conceal personal or political mistakes and 
indiscretions. It can also be a question of personal style and ingrained habit. Leaders from 
Gordon Brown to Angela Merkel have been accused of ingrained secretive modes of working, 
which they carried to high office.  
 
Any secrecy strategy can risk as well as protect a reputation. Simply avoiding media scrutiny 
or refusing to give a plausible explanation can drive a suspicion of “undemocratic tendencies” 
(Kane & Patapan 2012, p. 51). The exposure of secrets can trigger “indignation or 
resignation” among those watching, neither of which can help a leader (Bauhr & Grimes, 
2014). If larger secrets or cover-ups are exposed, the consequences can be hugely damaging. 
Leaders from Anthony Eden over Suez in 1957 to Richard Nixon over Watergate in 1974 – 
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both election winners and popular leaders – had their careers ended when their cover-up, 
collusion and poorly kept secrets were made public.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Theresa May and the Case of Brexit 
 
Prime Minister May’s appeal was tied to her ability to successfully negotiate Brexit (Allen, 
2018). May made it clear that her approach would involve secrecy. She promised strict 
confidentiality and said, “there will be ‘no running commentary’ on the negotiations” (Green, 
2016). Over the next two and a half years this commitment to confidentiality, and the policy 
itself, underwent a series of shifts and U-turns, culminating in May’s compromise draft deal 
being rejected by the House of Commons in a historic defeat in January 2019.  
 
May’s commitment to secrecy seems all the more remarkable in the face of decades of 
institutional pressure in the UK towards openness. Prime ministers from John Major in the 
1990s onwards have pushed various openness policies, from Major’s non-legal Code of 
Access in 1994 and de-classification initiatives, to Tony Blair’s FOI Act of 2005 and 
Cameron’s championing of Beneficial Ownership (Worthy, 2017). Taken together, successive 
leaders have created a powerful ecology of openness in which keeping secrets is far more 
difficult (Kreimer, 2018).  
 
Their championing of greater transparency did not prevent them facing charges of secrecy or 
suffering reputational damage. Major’s scandal and leak ridden government reached new lows 
of public popularity, while Blair’s liking for secretive “sofa” government, especially over 
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Iraq, and David Cameron’s controversy over his personal tax affairs both damaged their 
reputations (Worthy, 2017). Marsh (2018) argues that Brexit itself was driven by the “politics 
of truth”, arguing that “politicians are reluctant to and communicate to citizens the complexity 
of the problems with which they are faced, and acknowledge that they don’t have ‘ready-
made’ solutions” (Marsh, 2018, p. 80). Relying instead on the traditional notion that 
“government knows best”, successive prime ministers bred distrust and anti-elite feeling 
(Marsh, 2018, p. 83).  
 
Secrecy and Transparency as a Power Function 
 
Theresa May had a reputation for strict information control and a secretive working style. As 
Home Secretary between 2010 and 2016, she had a “preference for working with a close team 
of advisers [nicknamed the Chiefs], often not bothering to share information with Number 10 
or other ministers” (Parker & Vina, 2016). She avoided publicity and scrutiny when problems 
threatened, causing David Cameron to nickname her “the submarine” (Shipman, 2017). 
Secrecy was also bound up in May’s divided way of seeing politics as allies and enemies, 
where information was a key weapon to be hoarded in a partisan battle. May “survived as 
home secretary for six years partly because she held a tight grip over information flows” 
(Green, 2016). Twice in 2011 and 2016, blame avoidance and information control saved her 
career (Casciani, 2011; Travis, 2016).  
 
In the UK, prime ministerial control of the government agenda, the flow of information and 
the network of Cabinet committees can facilitate such an approach, though it is fraught with 
risk (Blick & Jones, 2016). May’s habits carried over into her premiership in 2016. Decisions 
continued to be made through a parallel system, with small groups of close advisors 
8 
 
controlling access to May, and threatening opponents (Shipman, 2017). The most important 
decisions of her premiership, from the pursuing of a “hard Brexit” in October 2016 to the 
triggering of article 50 in March 2017 and snap election of April 2017, were made in secret 
without consultation. May’s presidential style further exacerbated her remoteness. She 
conducted few interviews and only engaged occasionally in set piece, presidential style 
speeches (Shipman, 2017). Even Buckingham Palace complained at being kept in the dark 
about May’s plans (Worthy, 2017a). May’s secrecy was designed to give her room to 
maneuver and reconcile and hold together a deeply divided party and country, polarized over 
the referendum result and what to do next.  
 
Although May’s strategy of secretiveness was made more difficult after the failure of her snap 
election victory in 2017, her habits continued throughout 2017 and 2018. Her information 
control stretched from major to minor issues, from a refusal to release government documents 
to the opposition to a reluctance give interviews. In July 2018 MPs from here own party 
continued to complain of May’s “bunker mentality” and habit of “disregarding input from 
those outside her inner circle” (Cooper & Dickson, 2018). 
 
May’s secrecy had counter-productive results, creating an almost continual series of leaks 
from a series of sources, including other EU countries, officials and, perhaps most 
damagingly, her own Cabinet, who were deeply divided over what course to take (Pozen, 
2013). Increasingly frantic attempts to stop them often led to further leaks, with details of leak 
inquiries themselves leaked (Worthy, 2017a). It also triggered a wave of scrutiny and pressure 




The leaked information hampered the room for maneuver May sought. There was 
embarrassment in early 2018 at the leaking of the government’s own internal assessments 
showing that all Brexit scenarios would make the UK worse off. In late 2018, May’s final 
draft Brexit agreement was also leaked before being released, as were details of her plan to 
persuade her own MPs of it. Instead of giving her space and flexibility, her secrecy and leaks 
often furthered divisions in her own party and the country. 
 
Secrecy as a Substantive Function 
 
The government initially sought hold to May’s strict confidentiality principle, arguing that 
revealing its negotiating position too early would weaken their leverage. May sought to use 
the royal prerogative power, a vestige of Monarchical power that creates a “constitutional 
exceptionalism” for negotiations. This “cloaking of executive power” is only “semi-
impervious to norms of legality” (Poole, 2010, pp. 154-155). In 2016 the House of Commons 
appeared to recognize the government’s right to confidentiality, voting in support of a motion 
that said, “there should be no disclosure of material that could be reasonably judged to 
damage the UK in any negotiations to depart from the European Union” (Green, 2017). The 
government committed to being “as open as is possible... always subject to the overriding 
point that we cannot pre-empt the negotiation” (Davis, 2016). The Minister for Exiting the 
EU argued that “even were I to...keep it all entirely secret, I would fail. It would not be 
possible” (Davis, 2016).  
 
However, institutional friction from above and below pulled apart both the argument and legal 
protections. From above, the EU “weaponized” its own transparency. The EU Chief 
Negotiator committed to “negotiate in a transparent and open manner” and “to tell the 
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truth...to our citizens about what Brexit means” (European Commission, 2017). In early May 
2017 the EU published its draft negotiating guidance and documents (Ilot, 2017). 
 
This served a number of purposes. It was “a negotiating strategy calculated to increase its 
bargaining power” that was also driven by a “recognition that much of this material would 
leak anyway” (Ilot, 2017). It meant the EU could “control the public narrative around Brexit” 
and “strengthen its hand by reducing room for manoeuvre…from within, tying the EU 27 to 
agreed positions” (Ilot, 2017). Perhaps most importantly, this transparency served to limit the 
very room for maneuver that May’s secrecy was supposed to create. It pushed the UK towards 
the EU’s public timetable and procedures, leaving any “bespoke options” or flexibility 
severely curtailed (Green, 2016). The guidelines may have also added pressure on May to call 
a snap election (Shipman, 2017).  
 
In parallel, May’s secretive approach came under pressure domestically. Her plan for a 
“closed”, prerogative based Brexit began to unravel in November 2016 in the UK courts. The 
High Court ruled that the government ceded its prerogative powers and the legislature, not the 
executive, must have the ultimate say (Elliott, 2016). The UK the government also committed 
to providing the same openness to UK MPs as the EU Parliament-though this carried a twist, 
as it allowed only “closed oversight” through heavily protected reading rooms (Abazi, 2016, 
p. 12). 
 
This handed power to the third institution, the UK parliament, where a majority of members 
favored remaining in the EU. Over the next two years Parliament used all the tools at its 
disposal to force greater openness around Brexit. MPs and committees sought to fill the “the 
information vacuum” gap created by “the government’s reticence” (Wallace, 2018). 
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Parliament was greatly empowered after the 2017 general election, when May lost her 
majority making votes harder to win and enhancing the power of the opposition.  
 
Between 2016 and 2018 Select committees launched more than 108 inquiries into various 
aspects of Brexit, as well as creating a new, unusually large, DEXEU committee to oversee 
the whole process. The “publicity spotlight” at committee hearings revealed ministerial 
contradictions or confusion (White & Rutter, 2017). In one day in November 2017, for 
example, six committees simultaneously questioned six different officials and Ministers about 
Brexit. Behind the scene, pressure from Conservative back bench MPs forced May to be more 
open and publish the first Brexit White paper in 2017 and another in 2018. 
 
One key symbolic battle concerned the government’s own studies of the impact of Brexit. The 
studies existence was first mentioned in the summer of 2017. After FOIs were refused, in 
November 2017 Labour used an obscure piece of parliamentary procedure, a Humble Address 
to Her Majesty, to force the government into releasing them (Defty, 2017). Though the 
government then denied their existence, they were reluctantly released to the DEXEU 
committee. Labour used a Humble Address again to force the government publish legal 
advice on the controversial Northern Ireland backstop in December 2018. The government 
sought to head off pressure by publishing a summary, but this led to the Attorney General 
being held in contempt of Parliament and the full advice being published the next day (Defty, 
2018). 
 




Despite this continual pressure, May strived to keep the process as closed as possible. Her 
government refused a more open, cross-party approach in 2016 and again in 2017, only 
conceding to a form of cross-party talks in January 2019. In March 2018, it also passed draft 
legislation that would keep secret alleged details of “dark money” donations to the DUP 
(Cusick, 2017). In April 2018 the House of Lords EU committee formally complained of 
government providing “severely delayed or non-existent answers” or “providing a minimal 
response” to questions. May herself made three appearances before the Liaison committee 
between 2016 and 2018, where she had, as one observer put it “mastered the art of saying 
nothing” (Balls, 2017). This was not helped by parliaments sometimes “scattergun approach” 
to scrutiny, and political divisions between leave and remain MPs (White & Rutter, 2017, p. 
4).  
 
Nevertheless, by early 2019, May’s attempt to keep the Brexit process secret had failed. As 
table 2 shows, key pieces of information that the government clearly wished to keep secret, 
from impact assessments to legal advice, were forced out of them or leaked. Alongside this, 
parliamentary pressure through questions, statements and government scrutiny meant, as the 
Chair of the Exiting the EU committee put it, “we learn something new about the potential 
impact of Brexit every day” (White & Rutter, 2017, p. 6). 
 
Secrecy as Reputation 
 
In 2016 Theresa May offered “governing competence” and diligence, tied closely to her 
ability to successfully negotiate Brexit-with secrecy a necessary part of it (Quinn, 2018). Yet 
the tying together of leadership, Brexit and secrecy carried risks. During the general election 
campaign of 2017, May seemed the epitome of secrets herself, unable to respond to simple 
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questions or offer any information on a topic. Guardian sketch writer Crace (2017) christened 
her the “Maybot”, a robotic comparison that “encapsulated her awkward, disengaged manner” 
and inability to answer questions or open up. 
 
Brexit was the center of her claim to leadership and competence. Table 3 shows that the fall in 
public confidence in May’s ability to successfully complete Brexit. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Polling of the “truth telling” of “leading Conservative politicians” fell under May’s leadership 
to 19% in on March 2017 and 17% in October 17, compared to a slightly better 24% in July 
2015 and 22% October 2015 under David Cameron. May’s secrecy also obscured wider 
public understanding. By July 2018, only 16% of voters felt government policy on Brexit was 
“very” or “fairly” clear while 69% found it “fairly” or “completely” unclear in the same 
period (Smith, 2018).  
 
For May personally, continual leaking from cabinet meetings, especially after June 2017, left 
her looking weak and unable to control her government. In October 2017 details of a dinner 
between Theresa May and Michele Barnier leaked, where May was described as “pleading for 
her political life” and “anxious”, “tormented”, “despondent and discouraged” (Boffey, 2017). 
By 2019 May’s attempts at secrecy, tied to Brexit, had unraveled public confidence in the 






Secrecy and Donald Trump 
 
May’s approach can be compared with her near contemporary in the White House. Like May, 
Donald Trump carried long-standing habits of secrecy to the White House, reinforced by his 
divisive view of politics (Singer, 2016). His secrecy, again like May’s, was reputational. 
However, Trump has been both ruthlessly secretive and oddly open (Wolff, 2018). Trump 
appeared to need secrecy more than most leaders, as a remarkable number of damaging 
controversies dogged him before reaching the White House, from his own tax returns to the 
possibility of collusion with Russia (Peterson, 2017).  
 
While his predecessor portrayed himself as the transparency president, Trump publicly 
signaled his adherence to secrecy. He refused to release his tax returns and was keen to shield 
certain areas of his life from scrutiny, particularly his complex business interests (Wolff, 
2018). How his preference for secrecy translates into policy is yet to be fully seen: so far, the 
Trump administration has withdrawn from various international openness commitments and 
there are claims allegations of widespread avoidance of records laws by many in the White 
House itself, including his own family. Trump’s attitude appears to have triggered an 
administration wide slow-down on FOI requests, and wider attempt to re-write bureaucratic 
rules in favor of secrecy (Ellington, 2018; Birchall, 2018). Untruth and obfuscation are the 
defining feature of the Trump administration: Trump himself has also lied consistently about 
himself, his policies and his actions and his (self-described) “truthful hyperbole”, represents a 
dangerous disconnect from reality and denial of basic facts (Klaas, 2017; Singer, 2016). 
Trump has also issued a barrage of threats against leakers and used allegations of secrecy, 
concealment and conspiracy as a rhetorical weapon against Hillary Clinton and his own 




Yet Trump is also transparent in a very particular way. He promised to be “morally 
transparent” and his use of social media has offered unique insights into his views and 
thoughts in real time (Fenster, 2017, p. 174). Trump has publicly encouraged leakers, praised 
Wikileaks and (possibly accidentally) used his own powers to de-classify information to the 
Russian Foreign Minister (Ellington, 2018).  
 
Like May’s divided government, Trump’s faction-ridden and polarized government led to a 
constant stream of leaks. While May’s secrecy was focused on policy, Trump’s focused on 
his past behavior. The leaks have covered everything from Trump’s personal habits to faction 
fighting and policy. Most damaging of all has been a continual drip of revelations about 
possible collusion and obstruction with Russia. Information flowed from allies, factions and 
opponents, as well as the intelligence agencies. In January 2019 claims were made that Trump 
himself was investigated by the FBI as being a potential foreign agent. Wolff (2018) claims 
that, ironically, Trump is the source of many leaks in his night time calls to his friends.  
 
In one of the strongest Streisand effects in modern times, Trump’s secrecy triggered a 
continual and growing counter pressure for scrutiny. Again, like May, time has made keeping 
secrets harder and openness pressure more effective. Trump faced a series of secret 
investigations from his own intelligence agencies since 2016, and these have now been joined 
by a series of Congressional inquiries and the special counsel investigation by Robert 
Mueller. This has knocked the administration of course, and very clearly distracted Trump 
himself (Wolff, 2018). It has also played a role in Trump’s falling approval ratings, with 62% 






May was warned in late 2016 that “secrecy is not a strategy” (Worthy, 2017a). She tied her 
reputation to Brexit and Brexit to secrecy. Secrecy can, in certain contexts, be a necessary, if 
not fruitful, strategy for stabilizing a leader’s power and reputation (see also Fenster, 2014; 
Aldrich & Moran, 2018). There may be a positive spiral for some leadership secrecy, whereby 
confidentially allows effective policy making and, protects reputation and flexibility. In the 
short-term, May’s approach temporarily preserved her room for maneuver, and her power 
over a divided party and a difficult context. It also, perhaps, protected her reputation for 
competence for some time.  
 
However, in the longer term there were simply too many actors, too much pressure and Brexit 
too contentious within a polarized system. Both May’s and Trump’s attempts at secrecy must 
be understood against the background of an extensive transparency ecosystem.  
Secrecy triggered a negative spiral as greater counter-pressure for transparency, exposing 
May’s policy and undermining her own reputation. By 2019 May appeared to have lost 
control of the policy, the narrative and with it her own reputation.  
 
May’s Premiership and Trump’s Presidency shows how the context of secrets matters. Both 
were seeking to hide important issues of huge public and media interest and do so over a long 
period of time in a high polarized and partisan environment. To seek to keep such issues 
secret amid such a sophisticated transparency ecosystem, and divide, leak-prone governments, 
appeared highly unlikely. The risk, and public interest in opening up, was all the more 
probable given both leaders tied the secret to their reputation, so exposure had consequences 
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Table 1: Incentives for secrecy and related risks 
 Strengths Risks 
Power  
 




Guards a process or decision Can attract pressure for openness and 
institutional attention  
Reputation Protects image and 
confidence 
If exposed can damage to leadership 




Table 2: Timeline of Secrecy and Leaks 
 December 2016: House of Commons supports motion to keep parts of negotiations 
confidential 
 November 2017: Release of the ’58’ impact assessments, following FOIs and an 
opposition motion  
 January 2018: DEXEU analysis of the economic impact of Brexit released after a 
leak 
 December 2018: Attorney General found in contempt of Parliament over refusal to 
release full legal advice (then released). 
 
 
Table 3: WhatUKthinks 2019 
 Nov 2016 March 2017 March 2018 July 2018 
Very well 3 % 4 % 2 % 1 % 
Fairly well 22 % 28 % 23 % 15 % 
Fairly badly 24 % 18 % 30 % 30 % 
Very badly 22 % 21 % 28 % 43 % 
Don’t know 29 % 28 % 16 % 11 % 
 
 
